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Theauthorsexplicitlyconsiderthepublicpolicyissuesrelatedto thequestionof post-sale
shouldhandletheseissues.
warningsandoffersuggestionson howmarketers

The

topicof post-salewarningsis fraughtwithuncer-

taintyand trade-offs.Commentatorsnote thatcompanies encounterseveral difficulties meeting theirpostsale warning responsibilities(Jacobs 1992; Schwartz 1983;
Van Kirk 1989) and thatit might be easier to fulfill time-ofsale warningobligations (Matula 1996). In his articlein this
issue of the Journal of Public Policy & Marketing,Schwartz
(1998) addressesthree importanttopics with regardto postsale warnings: (1) whether marketersshould have a postsale duty to warn; (2) given that the draft version of the
Restatementof the Law of Torts:Products Liability (1997)
includes a post-sale duty to warn, what is the appropriate
natureand scope of such duty; and (3) under what circumstances should a marketer have to undertake a product
recall?
He considers these issues in the context of both the Model
Uniform Product Liability Act (1979) and the American
Law Institute's Restatementof the Law of Torts: Products
Liability (1997) project.' Schwartz states that marketers
should have a post-sale duty to warn, albeit a limited one.
The natureof this duty should be fault based and grounded
in traditionalnegligence concepts ratherthan strictliability.
He describes approvingly its narrowly drawn scope in the
draftRestatementand advises thata companyshould have a
"company-wideprotocol,"a contingency plan for assessing
the need for post-sale warnings. He concludes that when
marketersundertakevoluntaryproductrecalls, they should
be shielded from liability, unless they act recklessly in doing
so. Throughouthis article,Schwartzmaintainsa managerial
perspective by focusing on the implicationsof these policy
issues for managers.He does, however, raise a public policy
concern when he questions the fairness of what he labels
"hindsight jurisprudence," that is, holding a company
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a majorrole in shaping the Restatementof the Law of Torts:ProductsLiability (1997).

KARLA. BOEDECKER
is Professorof Law, University of San Francisco. FREDW. MORGAN
is Professorof Marketing,University of
is Senior Contract Administrator,
Kentucky. ALLENB. SAVIERS

WorldComNetworkServices.
Vol.17 (1)
Spring1998,127-131

responsible for product dangers, unrecognized before the
productlaunch, that come to light afterwards.
Our objectives in this comment are to (1) considerexplicitly the importantpublic policy issues relatedto the question
of post-sale warningsand (2) offer some additionalsuggestions about how marketingmanagers should handle postsale warningsand recalls.

PublicPolicyIssuesInherentin the
Questionof Post-SaleWarnings
In a society that enjoys a highly developed economy with
many technologically complex products,a certain number
of product-relatedinjuries are inevitable. Consumers have
become accustomed to a continuingcycle of new products,
and companies compete with one anotherto be the first to
provide these new offerings. This interactionraises two key
public policy issues:
1. Allocatingthe risksof product-related
injuries.Who should
bearthoserisksandin whatproportions?
2. Apportioning
thelossesfromproduct-related
injuries.At one
extreme,marketerswould bearthese losses in the formof
absolutetortliability,thatis, havingto pay the totalcost of
anysuchinjuries,regardlessof faultorproductdefect.At the
other extreme,consumersthemselveswould absorbthese
losses withoutany legal recourseagainstmarketers.
(Insurancehasa key rolehere,buton whomshouldpremiumcosts
fall-marketersor consumers?
Placingthoseinsurancecosts
on marketersmightcausethemto raisepricesaccordingly,
therebyeffectivelyshiftingthat burdenonto productpurchasers.Thisis nowa widespread
practice.)
Moreover, we live in a society with a sophisticatedmarketing and distributionsystem, in which many businesses,
often far removed from and beyond the awareness of consumers, performvarious marketingfunctions as part of the
distributionchannel. Under these circumstances,what policies will provide maximumincentives for marketersto take
active roles in maintaining product safety throughoutthe
streamof commerce?

Public Policy Issues with Regardto Warnings
The public policy underlyingcurrentlaw requiresthatproducts sold to consumersmustbe safe in termsof design, manufacture,and warnings,with warningsacting as a compensatoryfactorfor productsthatcannotbe designed to be com-
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pletely safe.2 Warnings must be given to consumers when
the product is dangerous in a manner that is not readily
determinableby examining it or by using it in a foreseeable
manner,even one unintendedby the marketer.These principles lead to three importantconsiderations.How hidden, or
latent,is the danger?How severe is the danger?Whatproduct uses or misuses are foreseeable?
Each of these questions involves a judgment about the
behaviorof personscoming in contact with the product.The
less obvious or more severe the danger,the greaterthe duty
to warn. To the extent that a product use is foreseeable,
regardlessof whetherit is intendedby the seller, a warning
must accompany the product. Because of the difficulty in
identifying the "bright line" that separates situations that
requirewarningsfrom those that do not, companies tend to
err on the side of caution, and warnings proliferate(Fuller
1997; Rechtschaffen 1996; Tyson 1987), which leads to
information overload (Weissman 1996; Zeckhauser and
Viscusi 1990).
Before productsreach the marketplace,companies are in
a position to anticipate unusual uses through producttesting, test marketing, focus groups, and brainstormingsessions. If a firm should thereby discover uses that expose
consumers to an unreasonablerisk of harm, warnings can
be appendedto productsto notify consumers not to engage
in these dangerous practices. Or, more fundamentally,
products can be redesigned with, for example, warning
sounds, deadmanswitches, restrictedmotions, or protective
devices, so as to reduce the chances thatconsumerswill use
productsincorrectly.
When the firm learns of a product'sdangerouspropensities after its introduction,the options available to the firm
are limited and differ in scope and effectiveness: do nothing,
warn current and future customers, or recall the product.
Rare is the situation in which a company would take no
action to respond to recently discovered productshortcomings. Even if the problem creates minor risks to consumers,
a series of incidents could lower consumers' perceptionsof
the productand therebyreduce futuresales.
In determining whether to issue a post-sale warning, a
firm is influenced by the laws and judicial decisions in the
jurisdictionsin which it operates, as well as by the recently
issued Restatementof the Law of Torts: Products Liability
(1997). The Restatement(1997, 10) provides four guidelines for evaluating the continuing duty to warn (see also
2A critical public policy question not fully discussed in this analysis is
the relationshipbetween design and warnings. The core questions is: To
what extent should legally adequate warnings be allowed to offset unsafe
product designs? For many products, the dangers cannot be "designed
away." For example, many pharmaceuticalproducts are safe if the prescribed dosages are ingested. The only way to preventoverdosing is to sell
single doses; however, this would be inconvenientand expensive. So drug
productsare marketedwith warningsregardingproperdosages. The design
versus warning trade-off actually involves a third factor: cost of an
absolutely safe design-if such a design exists.
The same issues arise in the battinghelmet example raised by Schwartz.
Childrenseem to be willing to do almost anything.A prudentmanufacturer
might attemptto issue warnings that address any and all unintendeduses,
that is, anythingnot relatedto the act of battingin the context of playing or
practicingbaseball. A question that is more perplexing as a public policy
matter is whether such a manufacturershould be relieved of liability
because its attorneys drafted a thorough warning that the children either
cannot or do not read and retain.

Lazaruset al. 1997; Wittner 1997): (1) the seller knows or
reasonablyshould know that the productposes a substantial
risk of harm to persons or property, (2) those to whom a
warningmight be providedcan be identified and reasonably
assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm, (3) a warning
can be effectively communicatedto and acted on by those to
whom a warningmight be provided,and (4) the risk of harm
is sufficiently great to justify the burden of providing a
warning.
Each of these guidelines is explicated in the context of a
reasonableperson in the seller's position. But because the
companyis tryingnot only to "do the rightthing,"but also to
avoid subsequentliability, the companymust anticipatewhat
a trierof fact (jury or judge) eventually might believe a reasonablepersonshoulddo underthe circumstances.
The extent to which the marketer reasonably can be
expected to learn about product-relatedproblemsis the critical determinationregarding the necessity for a post-sale
warning.When regardedcollectively as a distributionchannel, marketersare in a better position than consumers to
know aboutand deal with product-relateddangers.Many of
these dangersare not tangible to consumers-they take the
form of colorless, odorless, invisible substances. Or, they
exist as apparentlyharmless everyday objects that can have
carcinogeniceffects over time, such as asbestos fibers, toxic
emissions, or radiation. The company is better equipped
than consumers, either at the time of sale or post-sale, to
learnabouta product'sdangerouspropertiesthroughtesting.
The only caveat regardingrelative knowledge might be in
situationsthat involve corporateconsumers, for example, a
company that purchases industrial equipment for use in
making the productsit sells. But here the user's knowledge
might be, at best, equivalent to that of the salespeople and
designers of the equipment.It is difficult to imagine a situation in which productusers are clearly more informedabout
product-relateddangers than productmarketers.
If the seller claims not to have known about dangerous
product features, the issue becomes one of constructive
knowledge (i.e., did the seller have reason to know). A marketing organizationwith standardresearchand testing facilities will have a difficult time convincing a trierof fact that
it was unawareof product-relateddangers.
The issue of seller knowledge involves the notion of hindsight jurisprudencethat Schwartz raises. The cornerstone
tort principle of foreseeability, often assessed according to
what a reasonablemarketer"knew or should have known"
at the time of productsale, invokes the notion of hindsight
because this determinationoccurs after a claim has been
made. Thus, such judgments inevitably entail hindsight.
Allocating responsibility by applying a standard that
assesses whether a party possessed appropriateknowledge
seems both fair and desirable. A trier of fact should be
allowed to determine whether the marketer'sactions were
reasonable in light of what it knew or should have known
before placing the productinto the streamof commerce.
The absence of a hindsight knowledge standardcould
lead to situations in which defendants are exonerated
because they were unawareof product-relateddangers due
to inadequateproducttesting. Sound public policy involves
providing incentives (penalties) for companies to know
whethertheirproductsare safe before offering them for sale.
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The following hypotheticalexample illustratesseveral of
these post-sale warningsand repairissues.

A HypotheticalCase Example
Soda Bottling Company (Soda) bottles and distributesseveral brandsof soft drinks.Soda has purchasedand used several different models of vending machines, including those
manufacturedby the Vend-O Company.In September1997,
Soda receives a letter from Vend-O regardingsafety problems with some of Vend-O's machines. Vend-O's letter
states that (1) at least some of its machines have a tendency
to dispense a can of cola when tilted or rocked and (2) several accidents have occurredwhen its machines have been
tipped over on to people, resulting in serious injuries and
deaths. Enclosed with the letter is a sample warning label
decal, along with an offer to send Soda as many warning
decals as it needs. Vend-O furtheroffers to sell (at cost)
safety kits to all its customers to secure the machines to
walls or floors, therebyeliminatingthe risk of tip-over.Soda
decides not to use any of Vend-O's warningdecals and also
declines to orderany safety kits.
In November 1997, a 17-year-old high school student
rocks one of Soda's vending machines, which tips over and
crushes him. The machine was manufacturedby Quickserve, but it uses the same generic mechanicaldesign as the
model made by Vend-O and aboutwhich Vend-O wrote the
warning letter.The machineimproperlyallows a drinkto be
dispensed when the machine is tilted.
The deceased teenager'sestate sues both Soda and Quickserve underseveral productliabilityclaims. During the trial,
evidence is presented by other students that it was wellknown at the school that this particularmachine would (1)
often dispense a free drinkwhen the machine was rocked or
tilted and (2) sometimes fail to dispense a drink when the
full purchase price was properlydeposited. However, it is
unclear from the students' testimony whether the decedent
had deposited money into the machine.
The plaintiffs mechanical engineering expert testifies
that the vending machine model in question looks stable to
the average layman but is in fact highly unstablebecause of
a "top-heavy"design that allows it to be pushed over surprisingly easily. In addition,the expert states that when the
machine is tilted and dispenses a free drink,the next paying
customer buys an empty space and receives no product.The
same expert opines that the machine's combinationof tendencies has the effect of entrappingboth paying and nonpaying customers into rocking the unstablemachine.
Another importantwitness is Soda's technician,who services the machinesat the high school. The techniciantestifies
that he has received severalcomplaintsfrom school officials
regardingthe machine's propensityto take money without
dispensingthe paid-fordrink.Accordingto his testimony,the
technicianexplainedto school officials thatthe machinewas
not broken and that the problemwas with people tilting the
machine to get free drinks.The solution, he told the school,
was to either bolt the machinedown or attachwarningstickers to it. However, the technicianmade no effort to do either.
Analysis of Soda's liability appearsto fit well in the postsale duty to warn as set forthin the new Restatement(1997).
Several factors indicate thatSoda knew of a foreseeable risk
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of harmto its customers,yet failed to take measuresto prevent it. On receiving the letter from Vend-O, Soda had
actual knowledge of a dangerouscondition associated with
the purchaseof its productfrom machinesthatit owned. The
customers at risk included a target market comprised of
minors on their high school premises, a group notoriously
insensitive to risks associated with what they perceive as
"routine highjinks." Furthermore,a Soda employee had
acknowledged to school officials both the propensityof its
machines to take money withoutdispensinga drinkand that
people could obtain free drinksby tilting the machines. The
technicianapparentlymade no effort to see that school officials took any subsequentaction. Soda would be liable.
Quickserve's liability is less certain under the new
Restatementstandard.Quickserve'sactualknowledge of the
risks posed by its vending machines is unclearunder these
facts. Suppose that it did not know of either its machines'
instabilityor theirtendencyto dispense cans when rockedor
tilted. Should it have known of these defects before offering
them for sale to bottlerssuch as Soda? If not, should it have
become awareof them afterhaving sold them but before the
claim occurred?The new Restatementwould impose a postsale duty to warn on Quickserve if the company knew or
should have known afterthe time of sale or distributionthat
the product posed a substantialrisk of harm to persons or
property.That question can be answeredonly after a claim
is made, that is, in hindsight.
In any event, another manufacturerthat used the same
design has discovered the dangerouscondition and warned
Soda. If Vend-O could discover this, why couldn't Quickserve? Furthermore,Vend-O's offers of warninglabels and
a safety kit to Soda make it likely that the vending machine
instabilityproblemhad become known to the industry.Certainly Quickserve should have been awareof it by then.
In a case similar to this hypotheticalcase, the defendants,
the bottlerand vending machinemanufacturer,were granted
summaryjudgmentby a NorthCarolinatrialcourt (Morgan
v. Cavalier Acquisition Corporation 1993). However, a
state appellate court reversed this decision, stating that,
among other issues, there were genuine questions regarding
whetherthe defendantsshould have warnedaboutthe vending machine's instability.3
The outcome hinges on whetherit is believed that Soda
should be held accountablefor knowingabouta misuse of its
productandnot issuing post-salewarningsor installingsafety
devices to try to forestall the misuse. If Soda is allowed to
invoke the "no hindsight"defense, then Soda is exculpated.

How Marketing Managers Should

Handle Post-SaleWarningsand Recalls
When a marketing manager first learns about a productrelated risk of harm after the launch, his or her initial step
3Inanothersimilarcase, the defendantswere grantedsummaryjudgment
because they could show that the plaintiff was trying to steal a soft drink
from the vending machine (Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of
Decatur Inc. 1993). In Alabama,as in many states, someone cannot bring
a cause of action based all or in parton an illegal act. The dissenting opinion in Oden, more than twice the length of the majorityopinion, would
have allowed a jury to determineif Pepsi should have provided warnings
on its vending machines.
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should be to assess the potential dangers. This involves
immediate contact with distributors, retailers, and consumers to learn about the number and frequency of incidents, the severity of harm (both actual and potential), the
surroundingcircumstances, and any unanticipatedproduct
uses. The results may indicate a need for additionalproduct
testing, beyond what the firm did prior to the introduction,
that takes into account newly discovered conditions and
uses. If the firm subsequentlydeterminesa need for product
redesign or reformulation or a change in manufacturing
processes, it should considerundertakinga productrecall. In
situations in which both the risk of injury and severity of
harmare low, a post-sale warningmight suffice.
These alternativesare not mutually exclusive. A proactive firm can choose to issue immediate warnings while it
organizes and implements a recall campaign.
The firm must decide whether it has a duty to warn or
recall. This requires weighing the gravity and scope (number of personsand value of propertyaffected) of the risk, the
timing and substanceof the firm's knowledge, the extent to
which the firm has asserted actual or constructive control
over the product,and the ability of the firm to remedy the
defect.
A proactiveresponse by Soda, upon learningof Vend-O's
warning and safety kit offer, would have been to accept
Vend-O's offer of warning labels and have its own personnel attachthem to their vending machines as soon as possible. In addition, Soda should have worked with high school
officials to provide additionalwarningsto studentsthrough
announcements,bulletin boardnotices, the studentnewspaper, and any other available means of communications.4
Soda also should have undertakenan immediateinspection
of all its vending machines to determine the necessity and
feasibility of attachingthem to walls or floors or otherwise
securingthem.
A proactive response by Quickserve would have been to
devise and dispense warnings immediately to its machine
purchasers,both past and current.It needed to spread the
word aboutthis potentialmisuse of its productas quickly as
possible throughoutthe industry.The company also should
have offered information and assistance to its customers
regarding the advisability and means of stabilizing its
machines. If retrofitting was not possible, Quickserve
should have considereda productrecall. Over the long term,
productredesign appearsinevitable.

Protocols for Product Recalls
The scope and difficulty of a product recall campaign
dependon the natureof the marketand the distributionchannel that leads to it. At one extreme, in which the firm deals
with a small numberof readily identifiablecustomers(e.g.,
the Space Shuttle or jumbo jet aircraft, such as DC-10s),
notificationis straightforward.For motorvehicles, a mandatory, government-maintainedregistration system enables
marketersto reach virtually 100%of productowners.

4Although it does not fall within the post-sale duty to warn or recall
issues, the high school would have liability for the claim because it was on
notice of an unreasonablydangerouscondition on its premises,yet failed to
act.

Other products pose greater challenges. Although marketers of such items as home appliances, consumer electronics, and power tools often encourage purchasersto register the items, not all consumers do so. Wheneverpossible,
marketersshould maintaincustomer databasesthat include
model and serial numbers,addresses,and dates of purchase.
Likewise, marketersshould maintain such records for their
distribution channels. Modern information technology
makes the development and maintenanceof such management informationsystems both technicallypossible and economically feasible.
When such informationsystems are not feasible, as is the
case for many convenience goods, such as household cleaning products, over-the-counterpharmaceuticals,and packaged foods, marketersshould trackachieved distributionby
geographic area and retail outlets. Again, the technology
exists to do this with universal product codes and widespread checkout scanning of retail transactions.This capturesthe necessarydata at the point of sale and allows ready
access to it. Not long ago, the best that marketerscould do
in this regardwere store audits and consumer surveys--difficult, time-consuming,and of questionableaccuracy.

Development and Dissemination of Post-Sale
Warnings
When marketersdiscover an unanticipatedproduct hazard
after the product's introduction,time is likely to be of the
essence in communicatinga warningto users. Such pressure
might preclude the sort of warning tests that prudentmarketers otherwise should conduct as a standardpart of the
productdevelopmentprocess, much as they test advertising
messages and alternativemedia delivery plans.
At the very least, however, marketersshould consider not
only message content and how the targetaudience will perceive it, but also the likelihood that the warning will reach
the users. For consumer products, this raises questions of
how strongly to word the message, whether to provide it in
languages other than English (or use symbols), what communicationmedia to use, how much to budget for advertising and other communication efforts, and how long the
warning campaign should run. Although specific decisions
will depend on the particular facts and circumstances
involved, the marketer'soriginal promotionalexpenditures
and the length of the campaign preceding discovery of the
defect are bound to weigh heavily in determiningwhat constitutes a reasonablepost-sale warningeffort.
Determining the appropriatetarget audience for a postsale warning involves particularlysignificant, and difficult,
problems.For many consumerproducts,the purchaseris not
necessarily the sole user. Many household members other
than the registeredowner of a motor vehicle also might use
it. Neighbors commonly borrow tools. Professional housecleaners use products purchased by their clients. Thus, a
warningaddressedto the purchasermay not reach the user,
especially if the warning appears on the package or in the
instructionsthat the buyer discards before the user sees it.
Similarproblemsarise with industrialproducts.Schwartz
states that notifying employers about hazards associated
with tools and machineryused in manufacturingshould suffice to absolve industrialgoods marketersfrom responsibility for product-relateddefects that cause injury to users.
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This assumes that employers will pass along warnings to
their employees effectively. For a variety of reasons, ranging from simple oversight to a belief that such wamrnings
would inhibit or impede worker productivity, employers
might fail to do so. Indeed, any employer that does not act
reasonably to convey such wamrningsto its employees
nonethelesshas the protectionof the workers'compensation
system, which severely restricts the employer's obligation
to make the injured worker whole. In instances in which
effectively conveying the warningto workerswould lead to
changes in workplace practices that affect productivity
adversely, employers would have an economic incentive to
dilute the warningor not communicateit at all.

Conclusion
If marketersare not held accountable for communicating
safety-related informationlearned after their products are
marketedand sold, consumerscontinuallywill be subjectto
dangers about which they could have been warned. The
productmarketeris usually in the best position in the distribution channel to learn about post-sale problems with a
product through communications with resellers and consumers. The marketerthen can determinehow best to pass
this safety-relatedinformationon to currentand prospective
productusers.
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